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Polity o Volume XXXV, Number 2 * Winter 2002

Third-Party Voting in

Gubernatorial Elections:

A Study of Angus King of Maine

and Jesse Ventura of Minnesota*

Howard J. Gold

Smith College

This article analyzes the election of gubernatorial candidates Angus King of
Maine (1994 and 1998) and Jesse Ventura of Minnesota (1998) in an attempt to

determine the factors that produced these third-party victories. Previous studies

point to a "culture of independence" explanation for third-party success. Thi

approach focuses on attributes of the electorate, such as anti-partisan sentiment,

previous support for a third-party candidate, economic discontent, issue concerns, and youth. Using VNS exit poll data and a multinomial logit model, I find

that only two factors-anti-partisan sentiment and prior support for a third-party

candidate-are powerful explanations for the success of both King and Ventura

The analysis suggests that the Minnesota case comes closer to the more familia

model of a third-party candidate who runs against the establishment and who
mobilizes disaffected voters. There are, however, certain features of the electora

context-registration rules, money, candidate reputation and ideological profile-that bind these two cases and that also serve as powerful explanations fo
third-party success.

Howard J. Gold is an Associate Professor of Government at Smith College. His

research interests include partisanship and public opinion in the United States
Contact information: Department of Government, Smith College, Northampton,

MA, 01063. Email: hgold@smith.edu.

I. Introduction

When Ross Perot won nearly 20 percent of the vote in the 1992 presiden

election, many political observers saw in Perot the beginning of the end of

major parties' stranglehold on American politics. Perot won only 8 percent of

vote in 1996, but the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections marked the first pair
consecutive elections since 1856 and 1860 in which alternative candidates won

*Thanks to Donald Baumer, Robert Buchele, Lois Joy, Howard Reiter, Ron Seyb, Nicholas Xenos, and
the anonymous reviewers of Polity for helpful comments and advice.
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266 THIRD-PARTY VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

more than 10 percent of the vote.' Recent third-party success has been noteworthy

in sub-presidential elections as well. Two states, Alaska and Connecticut, elected
third-party governors in 1990-Walter Hickel in Alaska and Lowell Weicker in Con-

necticut. And two members of Congress were elected as independents, Bernard
Sanders of Vermont (first elected in 1990) and Virgil Goode of Virginia (elected as

an independent in 2000). Perhaps most striking were the recent successes of two

alternative gubernatorial candidates, Angus King of Maine and Jesse Ventura or
Minnesota. In 1994, independent candidate King captured 35 percent of the Maine

vote to become the state's second independent governor in twenty years. Four
years later, King coasted to re-election in a landslide, winning almost 60 percent of

the vote. Also in 1998, former professional wrestler and Reform Party candidate
Jesse Ventura captured 37 percent of the vote in a hotly contested Minnesota
gubernatorial election.
Studies of alternative candidate voting have identified a series of voter attributes

that contribute to the success of these candidates. Some have suggested that low
levels of partisan sentiment are a precondition of third-party success. Anti-partisan

sentiment comes in a variety of shapes and forms. A high degree of independence
among voters, low levels of satisfaction with the major parties or perceptions that

there is little to distinguish Democrats from Republicans (predicated upon either
incompetence or the parties' issue-positions): all of these have been variously cited
as explanations for the success of third-party candidates.2 It is also suggested that

young voters-youth representing weakened partisan attachments-are more susceptible to the appeal of alternative candidates.3 Others have pointed to voters' dis-

satisfaction with the individual candidates fielded by the major parties-it is said
that alternative candidates fare well when voters are unusually dissatisfied with the

major party candidates.4 Still others have looked to alienation from or cynicism
toward government as a precondition of third-party success.5 When voters feel as if
government is not acting in their interest, they are more likely to be receptive to the

outsider appeal of an alternative candidate. Some work has suggested that economic discontent produces an environment favorable to alternative candidate suc-

1. Rhodes Cook, "Voters Still Want More than Status Quo," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
December 21, 1996: 3474.
2. See, for example, Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in Amer-

ica: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure. Second Edition, Revised and Expanded (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Howard J. Gold, "Third Party Voting in Presidential Elections: A Study of Perot,

Anderson, and Wallace," Pblitical Research Quarterly 48 (1995): 751-773; and Daniel A. Mazmanian, Third
Parties in Presidential Elections (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974).
3. See, for example, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Conti-

nuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Pblitical Science

Review 63 (1969): 1083-1105.
4. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
5. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
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cess.6 And finally, a high level of issue awareness among voters is cited
another factor that contributes to third-party success.7

Much of the work on alternative candidate voting has focused on preside

elections and has examined factors such as levels of partisanship, alienation,

satisfaction and awareness, economic discontent, and candidate satisfaction i
national electorate. There is some recent work, however, that has begun to

on alternative candidate voting in sub-national elections. Endersby and Thom
study the 1990 election of U.S. Representative Bernard Sanders in Vermont and

clude that his success was based upon the policy preferences of his suppo

Reiter and Walsh study the elections of Governor James Longley of Maine in

Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut in 1990, and also of Sanders in Verm
Their basic finding is that state-specific and idiosyncratic factors-related to

date ideology and experience--explain the success of these particular candida

Donovan, Bowler and Terrio study support for third parties in California an

that factors such as voter dissatisfaction with major party candidates and p

tions that the major parties are very similar help us understand why people vot
third parties. Their major finding, however, is that identification with a third

also predisposes voters to reject the major party candidates at election-time.'

What links many of these works is their focus on the relationship between v

attributes and third-party voting. Reiter and Walsh label this approach the "c
of independence." Although these authors reject the argument, the "culture of

pendence" approach holds that third-party candidates are more likely to suc

when voters possess attributes that lead them to vote for an alternative cand

These attributes come in different shapes and forms, as I described above. Bu

links them is the notion that there is a common culture among voters that p
poses them to support independent or third-party candidates.

In this article, I expand and extend the analysis of alternative candidate votin

recent third-party gubernatorial successes in Maine and Minnesota. My pur

to assess whether the factors that are cited as explanations for third-party vot

other settings are helpful in explaining the outcomes in these two states. I

with some brief background on the elections of Angus King and Jesse Ve

6. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; and George A. Chressanthis and Stephen D.

fer, "Major Party Failure and Third-Party Voting in Presidential Elections, 1976-1988," Social Science Q

terly 74 (1993): 265-273.

7. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; and David J. Gillespie, Politics at the Perip
Third Parties in Two-Party America (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).

8. James W. Endersby and W. David Thomason, "Spotlight on Vermont: Third Party Success i
1990 Congressional Election," The Social Science Journal 31 (1994): 251-262.

9. Howard L. Reiter and Julie M. Walsh, "Who Votes for Non-Major Party Candidates? The Ca

Longley, Sanders, and Weicker," Poblity 27 (1994): 651-663.
10. Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and Tammy Terrio, "Support for Third Parties in California," Am

can Pblitics Quarterly 28 (2000): 50-71.
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before turning to an analysis of who voted for these alternative candidates and why.

My findings suggest that a culture of independence is a necessary but insufficient
precondition of third-party success. I argue that a fuller account of third-party suc-

cess requires an analysis of the electoral context, and I conclude with some observations about the role of money, registration rules, candidate reputation, and candidate ideology in shaping third-party success in Maine and Minnesota.

II. Background
Maine

Independent candidate Angus King was elected Governor of Maine in 1994, win-

ning 35.8 percent of the vote and narrowly defeating his Democratic opponent,
Joseph E. Brennan, a former two-term governor and member of the U.S. House of

Representatives (Brennan captured 34 percent). The Republican candidate, Susan
Collins, finished third, and won 23 percent of the vote, while another independent
candidate, Jonathan Carter, captured 6.5 percent of the vote. Like many third-party

and independent candidates elsewhere, King's campaign exploited anti-party senti-

ment-his slogan was "partnership, not partisanship.""
King's own background was in law, business and the media. Previously a Democrat, his only prior political experience had been as a Senate aide. He operated an
energy conservation business that proved to be very profitable. And he was widely
known across the state as the host of "Maine Watch," a public affairs interview pro-

gram on Maine public television, a position he held for 18 years.
King's campaign strategy was twofold. First, he went after the traditional parties.

He derided the bitter competition between them and blamed a two-week shutdown
of the state government in 1991 on partisan bickering. He concentrated his attacks
on his Democratic rival, accusing Brennan of advocating stale ideas left over from his

previous administration and deriding him as a "typical big-spending liberal hack."'2

Second, King presented his own blend of fiscal conservatism and social liberalism-

he called it "compassionate pragmatism."" He argued-reminiscent of Ross Perotthat his own background as a successful businessman provided him with the capac-

ity for dealing with the state's big budget shortfall. He advocated school reform,

including standardized tests and performance evaluation, and work for welfare
recipients, though he never criticized the idea of public assistance.14 And finally, he

vowed to create an environment that businesses would find more inviting.

11. Sara Rimer, "Unfettered by Party, He's Set to Govern," New York Times, November 18, 1994: Al6.

12. Associated Press, "Independent Elected Maine's Next Governor," Los Angeles Times, November 10,
1994: A17.

13. Rimer, "Unfettered by Party, He's Set to Govern."
14. Brian McGrory, "Maine Pragmatist Set to Govern," Boston Globe, December 18, 1994: 37.
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King ran as an independent but much of his campaign was directed to

attracting Republican voters. The Republican candidate, Susan Collins, never

aged to portray herself as a serious contender. So the real battle was fought bet

Democrat and independent. King's candidacy had certain advantages that

alternative candidates do not enjoy. First, from his media days, he enjoyed stat

name recognition. Moreover, by most accounts, he was media-savvy and tel

Conversations with voters suggest that more than his major party rivals, Kin

viewed as trustworthy. Second, King had money. He was a self-made mill

who spent $900,000 out of his own fortune on his campaign.15 Obviously
allowed him to level the playing field in competition with the major party

dates. And third, Maine offers an environment that is hospitable to alternative

didates. 37 percent of Mainers are registered independents.'6 The state elect

independent, James B. Longley, as Governor in 1974. And Ross Perot won 3

cent of the vote in Maine to finish second there in the 1992 presidential electio

best performance anywhere.
In 1998, when King sought re-election, any disadvantages associated with

an independent were outweighed by the advantages conferred upon him by i

bency. As the press put it, King by 1998 was a "relentlessly centrist incumbent

came through on first-term promises to balance an out-of-whack budget, st

line state government, and raise school standards."" King coasted to victory

turing almost 60 percent of the vote. His major party rivals were reduced t

third-party status: Republican James Longley, former member of the House of

resentatives and son of the former independent Governor, captured 19 perce

the vote, while Democrat Thomas Connolly, won only 12 percent.'s Whereas
emphasized fiscal conservatism and targeted profligate Democratic spending

initial run for the governorship, by 1998, he ran from the center, arguing that

parties have to remind themselves that things happen in the middle of the id

ical spectrum, not the extremes."'9
Minnesota

On October 23, 1998, only ten days before the Minnesota gubernatorial election,
an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune described the conventional wisdom at

that time-"no pundit, professor, or political pro believes Ventura can win."20 On

15. McGrory, "Maine Pragmatist Set to Govern."

16. Washington Post. "Sketches of New Governors," November 10, 1994: A38.
17. Elizabeth Mehren, "Maine has a Role Model for Ventura," Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1998:
A5.

18. Tivo other independent candidates captured a combined 10.4 percent of the vote as well.
19. Kenneth Chutchian, "Gov. King's Rivals Scrap for Support," Boston Globe, August 23, 1998: F15.
20. Bob von Sternberg and Dane Smith, "Governor's Race Profile," Minneapolis Star Tribune, October
23, 1998: IA.
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November 3, Jesse Ventura turned the conventional wisdom on its head and captured 37 percent of the vote in a heated three-way race to become Minnesota's first
non-major party governor since 1938.21

Ventura's previous career as a professional wrestler is well known but should
not be diminished as it provided him with instant name recognition statewide, an
asset for any third-party candidate. Ventura had also served as mayor of Brooklyn

Park, the state's sixth largest city (population 60,000), as a talk-radio host, and
appeared in several movies. These careers also enhanced his name recognition.
Unlike many other alternative candidates, Ventura's campaign did not become
associated with a burning issue that seized the electorate. Ventura certainly made

his issue positions clear-he repeatedly described himself as a fiscal conservative

and social liberal-but media accounts suggested that Ventura's growing appeal
was predicated upon public disaffection from politics and from the political parties.

His opponents were Republican candidate Norm Coleman, a former mayor of St.

Paul who had switched from the Democrats (DFL); and state Attorney General
Hubert Humphrey III, son of the legendary Minnesota Democrat Hubert Humphrey,
but a name perhaps too well known in a time of outsider politics. In contrast to the

major parties, Ventura promised to reject contributions from special interests. As
one op-ed author wrote in the Minneapolis Star- Tribune, "the most damning factor

against both candidates was their party affiliation. The GOP and DFL have ceased to

be ideological platforms in the eyes of most voters. They have become conglomerates of small but powerful lobbies with deep pockets that seek to buy influence at
all levels of government."22

Why did Jesse Ventura pull off such a spectacular upset? Post-election analysts

suggest that voters assessed Ventura's personal qualities and found them to be far
more appealing than those of his major party opponents. These qualities included
integrity and outsider status. But it is also important to emphasize other factors that

enhanced Ventura's ability to compete. First, he was very well known. Second, Min-

nesota provides public financing to gubernatorial candidates, and Ventura, as the
Reform Party candidate, ended up receiving almost $500,000 in public funds, thus
enabling him to mount a visible statewide campaign.23 Ventura also participated in

21. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Farmer-Labor Party supplanted the Democrats as the other contending

party in Minnesota elections. The Democrats regained major party status in 1944 when they merged with
the Farmer-Labor Party. As a result, the Democrats in Minnesota are known as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor

(DFL) Party. See Millard Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The Third Party Alternative (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1979). And the Republican Party in Minnesota is officially called the Inde-

pendent Republicans.
22. Kenneth Nuckols, "Why We Voted for Jesse," Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 7, 1998: 19A.
23. In the 1998 gubernatorial election, each of the three candidates received $310,282 from the general
campaign fund (this money is split evenly among candidates whose parties have received at least 5 percent

of the vote in previous elections). The candidates also receive an additional share of public funding that is

determined by party preference check-offs on state tax forms. Here, Ventura, as the Reform candidate,
received only $16,500 compared to $293,000 for Humphrey (DFL) and $249,000 for Coleman (Republican).
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the gubernatorial debates and by most accounts, used his "plain-speaking, hom

spun wisdom"24 to maximum advantage. Minnesota also has same-day voter reg

tration, enabling last-minute voters, who are disproportionately young and politic

inexperienced, to vote. In fact, over 330,000 voters, or about 16 percent of the e
torate, registered on election day.25 And about 60 percent of Minnesotans voted in

1998 election, a figure significantly higher than the 1998 national average of 36 p

cent. According to a Coleman campaign operative, 100,000 new voters voted in M

nesota that day, with 80 percent of them supporting Ventura.26 Finally, Minnesota

a strong tradition of third-party politics. From the 1920s until the mid-1940s, Dem

ratic gubernatorial candidates ran a poor third behind Republicans and Farm

Labor Party candidates. And in recent Senate elections in Minnesota, the Refor

Party candidate has gathered between five and seven percent of the vote, there
securing funding and a place on the ballot for future Reform party candidates.

III. Multivariate Analysis of Third-Party Voting

The various theories of third-party voting that I described at the outset spec

conditions under which third-party candidates do well. These theories yield a se

of hypotheses about the electorate. What the theories hold in common is the cl

that voters who possess certain characteristics-alienation, anti-partisan sentime

etc.-are more susceptible to the appeal of an alternative candidate.

The Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll questions27 allow for the testing of t
following hypotheses generated by theories of third party voting:

* that previous support for a third-party candidate predisposes voters to suppo

an alternative candidate;

* that independents are more likely than major party identifiers to support
alternative candidate;
* that young voters are more likely to support an alternative candidate;

* that economic discontent predisposes voters to support an alternative cand
date;
* that issue preferences predispose voters to support an alternative candidate.

Finally, matching funds are also provided to candidates-Ventura qualified for $177,658, compared to
$181,000 for Humprhey and $176,000 for Coleman. (Source: Minnesota Campaign Finance & Public Disclosure Board, Minnesota Secretary of State, http://www.sos.state.mn.us.)
24. Dane Smith and Robert Whereatt, "Ventura Wins," Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 4, 1998:
1A.

25. Minnesota Secretary of State. Internet site located at http://www.sos.state.mn.us.

26. Brian Sweeney, "Insider's Account of the Coleman Campaign's Final Days," Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 15, 1998: 25A.
27. The data throughout the article are from the VNS exit polls, 1994 and 1998. The data are distributed
by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The analysis is of course limited by the
scope of questions posed by VNS to voters as they left the voting booth.
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To test these hypotheses, I constructed three multivariate models of third-party

voting, one each for Maine in 1994, Maine in 1998, and Minnesota in 1998. Each model

includes variables that allow for the testing of these hypotheses, as well as some addi-

tional demographic control variables. These models are presented in Table 1.

In each of the three elections, the dependent variable is respondent's vote
choice.28 To estimate the effects of the explanatory variables, I constructed three
multinomial logistic (MNL) models, one for each election.29 In all three years, voting
Democrat or Republican is the response category and voting for the third-party can-

didate is the reference (or excluded) category. As a result, positive coefficients in

Table I represent an increased likelihood of a Democratic or Republican vote

whereas negative coefficients denote a higher probability of supporting the third-

party candidate. For ease of interpretation, I converted the models estimated in
Table I into predicted probabilities of major party versus third-party support (see

Table 2).30 The top row represents the probability of supporting the major party can-

didate for a voter who is measured at the mode on every independent variable in

the model. Subsequent rows display the probability of supporting the major party

candidate for a respondent who is.measured at the mode on every independent
variable except the one indicated in the first column.

Angus King in Maine
The multivariate analysis in Table 1 points to several key findings. First, in the

1994 race between Democrat Brennan and independent King, Republican identifiers, Bush supporters (from 1992), conservatives, and well-educated respondents

were all significantly more likely to support the independent candidate.31 To some

28. In all three years, the dependent variable is trichotomous, with I = vote for the Democratic candi-

date, 2 = vote for Republican candidate, and 3 = vote for the third-party candidate (King or Ventura). The
coding scheme for all the variables is described in the Appendix.

29. Multinomial logistic regression is an appropriate technique when the dependent variable is a nominal variable with more than two categories. See John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability,

Logit, and Probit Models (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1984); and Anthony J. Nownes, "Primary, General
Elections, and Voter Turnout: A Multinomial Logit Model of the Decision to Vote," American Politics Quarterly 20 (1992): 205-226. The model produces two sets of estimates for each election: the effect of the independent variables on the odds of supporting the Democrat over the third-party candidate, and the effect of
the independent variables on the odds of supporting the Republican over the third-party candidate.
30. In MNL, the effect of the coefficients on the probability of third party voting depends not only on the

value of the coefficient but also on the value assumed by the independent variable. To estimate the proba-

bility of third-party voting using the MNL coefficients displayed in Table 1, I first substituted the modal value

of each variable into the MNL model. I then changed one or two variables at a time to illustrate the impact
of that change on the probability of third-party voting for a voter who was otherwise measured at the mode.

These probabilities are shown in Table 2. See Raymond E. Wright, "Logistic Regression," in Reading and
Understanding Multivariate Statistics, ed. Laurence G. Grimm and Paul R. Yarnold (Washington, DC: Amer-

ican Psychological Association, 1995).
31. Previous presidential vote choice, party identification, and ideology are all nominal variables with
multiple categories. In constructing these dummy variables, I excluded Clinton voters, Democratic identi-
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extent, King's appeal mirrored that of a Republican candidate. In fact, given

weakness of Republican candidate Susan Collins, it is not far-fetched to sugge

although King ran as an independent, the 1994 gubernatorial election in Main

the look of a traditional Republican-Democratic race.

But beyond King's appeal to traditional Republican constituencies, two othe

tors stand out. All other things being equal, Perot voters were significantly more

to support King than either Brennan or Collins. The figures in Table 2 suggest th

modal voter32 had a 60 percent chance of supporting Brennan over King wh

Perot supporter who otherwise measured at the mode had only a 31 percent c

of supporting Brennan over King. Similarly, being an independent was signif

related to support for King over his Democratic rival-Democratic identifiers we

percentage points more likely than independents to support Brennan over Ki

Table 2). It is clear from these figures that when controlling for all other explan

having previously supported a third-party candidate and identifying as an inde
ent were important explanations for Angus King's initial success.

Other traditional explanations for third-party success are less convincing i
context of this Maine election. Voters whose financial situation worsened were n

more likely to support King. Being young (and therefore politically inexperi

was not a significant predictor of support for the independent candidate (no

gender, race, or income). And finally, self-described moderate voters were no
likely than liberals or conservatives to respond to King's centrist appeal.

By 1998, when Governor King coasted to reelection, his principal opponen

now a Republican (Longley) and King, running as a centrist, demonstrated a
the-board strength. Only three factors produced significant increases in the

bility of a Republican vote: support for Dole, identification as a conservativ

support for Perot.33 On the Democratic side, independents, Republicans, mo

ates, and women were all more likely to support King than his Democrati

(Connolly) but an examination of the probabilities associated with these categ
(see Table 2) suggests that these effects were not especially strong. In addition,

port for Perot was not a significant predictor of support for King over Connol

in 1994, being young or economically worse off made no difference in the

that voters made. I argued earlier that King's primary persona in 1998 was in

bent, not alternative candidate. His across-the-board support would lead

fiers, and liberals. As a result, the coefficients on " Perot voter" and "Republican voter" represent the

of these variables in comparison to Clinton voters (excluded category). The coefficients on "Indep
ID" and "Republican ID" represent the effect of these variables in comparison to Democratic ide

(excluded category). And the coefficients on "Moderate" and "Conservative" represent the effect o
variables in comparison to Liberals (excluded category).

32. See notes at the bottom of Table 2 for a description of the modal voter in each of these electio

33. Support for Clinton is the excluded category in this series of dummy variables (see note 31). Th
fore, the coefficient on the Perot voter variable represents the difference between a Perot voter and

ton voter. As expected, Perot voters were more likely than Clinton voters to support Longley over Ki
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Table 1

Multinomial Logit Model of Third-Party Voting

(entries are logit coefficients, standard errors in parent

Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minn

Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Hu
Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. V
CONSTANT

3.83*

1.57

(1.24)
INCOME

0.01

-0.0006

(.08)
OLDER

VOTER

FEMALE

VOTER

WHITE

VOTER

0.001

-0.25

(.17)

-0.01

(.17)

-1.41

(1.11)
EDUCATION

(.

(.25)

-0.26*

(.08)

0

(.26)

-0.003

11)

-0.67

(.43)

(.09)
0.48

-0.003

(.23)

0.001

(1.37)

0.22

(.92)

-0.19*

(.08)

0

(.47)

-0.79*

(.28)

-1.84

(1.15)

-4.01*

(1.53)

0.001

(.08)

0.16

(.26)

-0.04

(1.28)

0.

(.09

ECONOMIC DISCONTENT 0.01 -0.10 0.18 0.1

(.12)
STATE

(.12)

(.21)

ECONOMY
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(.17)

-0.38

Table 1 (continued)

Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minn

Brennan (D) Collins (R) C
Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. V
GUN

CONTROL

-1.22*

PEROT VOTER -1.23* -0.55* -1.13 1.37* -

(.22) (.25) (.60) (.36) (

REPUBLICAN VOTER -0.86* 0.15 -0.34 1.55*

(.25) (.25) (.49) (.33)
INDEPENDENT ID -1.14* 0.17 -0.92* 0.002

(.20)

(.26)

(.32)

(.36)

(

REPUBLICAN ID -1.56* 0.46 -1.24* 0.77 -

(.27) (.28) (.56) (.40)
MODERATE

-0.31

0.43

(.21)

(.29)

-0.68*

(.32)

0.68

(.52)

CONSERVATIVE -0.64* 0.63* -0.37 1.23

(.26) (.31) (.41) (.53)
* p < .05, significant coefficients in bold.

Aldrich-Nelson pseudo-R2: 0.24 0.2
Percentage of cases correctly predicted: 55.4
Sample
size:
995
609
1
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Table 2

Effect of Key Variables on Probability of Third-Party

(entries are probability of voting for major party candidate v. t

Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minn

Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Hu

v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ve
Modal
Perot

voter
voter

Clinton

.60

.43

.31

voter

.14

.31

.60

.09

.05

.43

.28

.14

.09

Bush (92) or Dole (96) voter .39 .47 .10
Independent
Democratic

ID
ID

.60
.83

.43
.39

.06
.14

.09

.09

Republican ID .50 .51 .05 .17
Perot voter + Independent ID .31 .31 .02
Moderate
Liberal

.60

.67

Conservative
Low

High

.43

.33
.52

education

education

.14

.24
.49

.66

.41
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.09

.10

.18

.48

.30

.

.15

*

*

*

*

Table 2 (continued)

Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minn

Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Hum

Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ve
Male

.66

Female

.44

.60

.26

.43

.09

.14

.09

.7

.

Under 30 years old .56 .44 .24 .0
30 plus years old .60 .43 .14 .09

Excellent state economy * * *
Poor state economy * * * *

Opposed to gun control * * * *
Supports gun control * * * *
a In Maine 1994,
stayed the same,

the modal voter had the
voted for Clinton in 199

b In Maine 1998, the modal voter had the
for Clinton in 1996, identified as a Democ

c In Minnesota 1998, the modal voter had
the same, state economy was good, suppo
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expect many of these variables to be weak or insignificant-as indeed they are. In
short, the 1998 findings displayed in Table I tell the story not of an alternative can-

didate trying to assemble a coalition of anti-partisan and disaffected voters but
rather of a popular incumbent attracting votes from all segments of his electorate.
Jesse Ventura in Minnesota

Jesse Ventura ran against the political parties and against the establishment
when he sought the governorship of Minnesota. To what extent did this more tradi-

tional third-party campaign win over voters whose qualities make them susceptible

to an outsider's appeal?
Several factors account for Ventura's success. According to the VNS exit polls,
fully 76 percent of Perot voters cast a ballot for Ventura. The findings in Table I
reveal that even after controlling for other explanations, prior support for Perot
exerted a strong and significant effect on support for Ventura over both of his major

party rivals. Although Perot did not campaign for Ventura-indeed he remained
silent with respect to Ventura's candidacy-Ventura did run under the banner of the
Reform party, the party that Perot founded. To the extent that a loyal core of Reform

voters existed in Minnesota, Ventura was highly successful in wooing their support.

Partisanship also played an important role. In the choice between Ventura and
Republican Coleman, partisanship operated in a predictable fashion-Republican
identifiers were more likely than Democratic identifiers to support Coleman over
Ventura, and there were no differences between independents and Democrats. On
the Democratic side however, both Republicans and independents were more likely

than Democrats to support Ventura over Humphrey. There is, moreover, a very
strong joint effect of independence and prior support for Perot (see Table 2). The
modal voter had a .77 probability of supporting Humphrey over Ventura and a .30

probability of supporting Coleman over Ventura. Among independents who supported Perot, these probabilities drop sharply to .13 and .14, respectively.
There are other noteworthy patterns in Tables I and 2. At least one issue appears to
have played a role--opponents of gun control were more likely to support Ventura over

either of his opponents. Ventura's appeal over Humphrey also resonated among those
under the age of 30 and among those who felt that the state economy was in poor condition. And the least educated were more likely than the most educated to support the
third-party candidate. These particular effects-youth, economic anxiety, opposition to

gun control, as well as independence and a previous vote for Perot-confirm the portrait of Ventura as a populist third-party candidate who mobilized disaffected voters.

IV. Observations and Conclusions

Why do third-party candidates do well in some elections and poorly in o

There are at least two approaches one might take to answer this question. T
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approach---<haracterized by the theories of third-party voting presented at

outset--directs us to examine the characteristics of voters themselves. When voter

cynicism or economic discontent runs high, when dissatisfaction with the major
parties or their candidates rises, or when voters are young or politically inexperi-

enced-they are more likely to support third-party candidates. The second
approach focuses on the context in which the election is fought. Can a third-party
candidate mobilize new voters by means of relaxed registration rules? Can the alter-

native candidate draw on financial resources on or near par with the major party

candidates? Does the third-party candidate enjoy an established reputation and
wide name recognition? When a third-party candidate is well known and can take
advantage of deep coffers, then that candidate is likely to do well, at least by traditional third-party standards.

The case of Ross Perot in 1992 illustrates the importance of electoral context.
Rosenstone et al. report that when applied to the 1992 presidential election, their
otherwise accurate model of third-party voting predicted that only six percent of the

electorate would defect from the major parties.4 In fact, nearly 20 percent of voters

cast a ballot for a minor party candidate, and Perot alone won 18.9 percent. Why
was their model so wide off the mark in 1992? An electoral context exceptionally
favorable to a third-party candidate accounts for the difference. Perot's deep pock-

ets, the media attention lavished upon him, and his presence alongside President
Bush and Governor Clinton in the televised debates propelled him to a prominence
that most third-party candidates never achieve. In particular, Perot's ability to spend
was a crucial factor in explaining his success relative to other third-party candidates.

Rosenstone et al. forecast that had Perot's expenditures equaled John Anderson's

1980 expenditures (relative to what the major parties spent), Perot's vote would
have dropped by nearly six percentage points.

The analysis presented here provides some evidence to support the notion that
certain voters are indeed more likely to support a third-party candidate. Two factors
in particular emerge as powerful predictors of third-party support. First, the pres-

ence of a large bloc of independents proved to be a significant explanation for the
success of these alternative candidates. Although neither state contained an unusually high proportion of self-described independents,35 it is true that independents
were still more likely to support the alternative candidate, and when controlling for
all other factors, by substantial margins. This finding confirms other research con-

ducted at the presidential level.36 The presence of a large bloc of independents (or

34. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America, 259.
35. According to the VNS exit polls, 29.6 percent of 1994 Maine voters were independent compared to
35.5 percent of voters nationally. In 1998, 27.8 percent of Maine voters and 26.2 percent of Minnesota voters

called themselves independent. The national figure in 1998 was 24.3 percent.
36. See, for example, Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; Gold, "Third Party Voting in Presi-

dential Elections"; and Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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voters with weak attachments to the established parties) is a precondition of third-

party success.

A second explanation was significant in both Maine elections and in the Min-

nesota case: voters who have demonstrated a previous relationship with a third
party are more likely to cast a ballot for subsequent third-party candidates. Donovan, Bowler and Terrio found that voters who identify with a third party are more
likely to support third parties in a variety of statewide elections.37 Similarly, prior

support for Ross Perot was strongly correlated with support for Angus King and
Jesse Ventura. Ross Perot ran very well in Maine and Minnesota, both in 1992 and

in 1996, and many voters in these states had already cast a ballot for him." Evidently, a prior vote for a third-party candidate presages a future vote for a third-party

candidate, and these voters-who at least twice supported alternative candidatesmay indeed constitute a bloc that third parties can mobilize.
The strong effect of independence and prior support for a third-party candidate
suggests that growing partisan instability in the electorate has paved the way for third-

party breakthroughs. In 1960, The American Voter argued that voters held long-term

psychological attachments to the parties and these attachments shaped the vote
choice. Subsequent work offered a more fleeting conception of partisanship, one
rooted in retrospective assessments of party performance-but still posited a strong
relationship between party identification and electoral support for one of the major

parties. By the 1980s, Wattenberg and others provided much evidence of party
decomposition in the electorate."9 One consequence of this growing partisan instability has been the success, in the 1990s, of these alternative gubernatorial candidates-alongside the success of other third-party candidates. Increasing numbers of
voters have been willing to break the partisan mold and cast a ballot for a minor party

candidate. Indeed, as more voters undergo the experience of actually voting for a
third-party candidate, they become more likely to do so again in the future. Thus partisan instability and partisan decline have become the lifeblood of third-party success.

But beyond the effect of being independent and having voted for Perot, the
Maine and Minnesota cases hold little in common. Economic anxiety played no role
in Maine but perception of the statewide economy was a significant predictor of the

vote in Minnesota.40 Similarly, age had no effect in Maine but was an important

37. Donovan, Bowler, and Terrio, "Support for Third Parties in California."
38. In 1992, when Perot won 19 percent of the national vote, Maine was his strongest state; he captured
30 percent of the vote. In Minnesota that year, he won 24 percent of the vote. In 1996, Maine was again his
strongest state. He won 14 percent of the vote in Maine, 12 percent in Minnesota, and 8 percent nationally.

39. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American
Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Morris P Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties; and Leon D.
Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
40. In the VNS exit polls, Maine and Minnesota voters were asked about their own economic situation.
But only Minnesota voters were asked to assess the statewide economy.
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factor in Minnesota. In fact, the data analysis suggests the Minnesota election com

closer to the more familiar model of a third-party candidate who runs against

establishment and who mobilizes disaffected voters-young, anti-partisan, co

cerned about the state economy, and in this particular case, opponents of gun c
trol as well.

Certain features of the electoral context, however, bind the two cases under stu

and suggest that one must look beyond the electorate for a fuller explanation of th

party success. After all, the number of independents has grown nation-wide; ye

most states third-party candidates continue to be marginalized. Four factors link t

Maine and Minnesota cases. First, both King and Ventura enjoyed statewide nam
recognition alongside reputations for personal integrity. As Rosenstone, Behr,

Lazarus argue in the context of presidential elections, "nationally prestigious" cand

dates enjoy significant advantages over ones that are not well known.41 It is wo

pointing out that the two other alternative candidates elected Governor in
1990s--Walter Hickel in Alaska and Lowell Weicker in Connecticut-were also well

known figures with established political reputations in their states. Second, both King

and Ventura ran as fiscal conservatives and social liberals-an ideological profile that

distinguishes them from the major parties and appears to hold some appeal for
voters. Third, elections in both states are conducted in an environment conducive to

third-party success. Both states allow election-day voter registration, thus enabling
alternative candidates to more easily mobilize new voters who often constitute a sig-

nificant part of their coalition. And both candidates were able to spend significant

sums of money-Ventura from the state's generous public financing program and
King from his personal fortune-that enabled them to compete against the major
parties on a level playing field.42 Fourth, both Maine and Minnesota are states with

established traditions of third-party voting, traditions that create an environment

more hospitable to alternative candidates.
The victories of Angus King in Maine and Jesse Ventura in Minnesota, alongside
other third-party successes in recent years, point to a slow but creeping public will-

ingness to at least consider alternative candidates. A series of surveys in the 1990s
suggest that Americans have little confidence in the two-party system and believe
that a viable third-party alternative would improve the quality of the nation's politi-

cal life.43 Moreover, the success of these candidates, especially Ventura, was predicated upon the removal of obstacles that consistently stand in the way of third par-

ties, both in gubernatorial and in presidential elections-financing, access to media
and to debates, and ability to mobilize disaffected voters, especially late in the cam-

41. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
42. Maine recently adopted the Maine Clean Election Act to provide public financing to candidates running for state office, beginning in 2000.
450.

43. Christian Collet, "Third Parties and the Iwo-Party System," Public Opinion Quarterly 60 (1996): 431-
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paign. The analysis of the gubernatorial elections in Maine and Minnesota suggests

that the success of third-party candidates depends not only upon voters who are
favorably disposed to the appeal of such a candidate but also upon an electoral context that gives these candidates a fighting chance.
APPENDIX

Coding of Variables in Multinomial Logit Models

Dependent variable
Vote choice: 1 = Democratic candidate; 2 = Republican candidate; 3 = Angus
King (Maine) or Jesse Ventura (Minnesota).
Independent variables
Income: Six-point scale where 1 = less than $15,000; 2 = $15,000-$29,999; 3 =
$30,000-$49,999; 4 = $50,000-$74,999; 5 = $75,000-$99,999; 6 = $100,000 or more.

Older voter: 0 = less than 30 years; I = 30 years or older.

Female Voter: 0 = male; I = female.
White voter: 0 = non-white; I = white.

Education: 1 = no high school; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = some college;
4 = college graduate; 5 = post-graduate.
Economic discontent: Financial situation is 1 = better; 2 = same; 3 = worse.

State economy: I = excellent; 2 = good; 3 = not so good; 4 = poor.
Gun control: 0 = supports gun control; I = opposes gun control.
Perot voter: 0 = voted Democrat or Republican in previous presidential election; I = voted for Perot in previous presidential election.

Republican voter: 0 = voted Perot or Democrat in previous presidential election; I = voted Republican in previous presidential election.
Independent ID: 0 = identifies with major party; I = identifies as independent.

Republican ID: 0 = identifies as independent or Democrat; I = identifies as
Republican.
Moderate: 0 = identifies as liberal or conservative; 1 = identifies as moderate.
Conservative: 0 = identifies as liberal or moderate; 1 = identifies as conservative.
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